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Abstract
One of the most remarkable features of globalization is the fact that advances in technol-
ogy have contributed to reducing the cost of trade (e.g., transportation and communication
costs), and thus boosted international trade. Under these circumstances, the importance of
distance should have diminished over time, which would constitute a boon for countries lo-
cated far from the main centers of economic activity. However, one of the best-established
empirical results in international economics is that bilateral trade decreases with distance.
This apparent contradiction has been labeled as the “missing globalization puzzle”. We
propose yet another explanation to this apparent contradiction based on the concept of geo-
graphic neutrality, which we use to construct international trade integration indicators for
two different scenarios, namely, when distance matters and when it does not. Our results
indicate that the importance of distance varies greatly across countries, as revealed by dis-
parate gaps between distance-corrected and distance-uncorrected trade integration indicators
for different countries. Some factors rooted in the literature explain away the discrepancies,
but their importance varies according to the trade integration indicator considered—trade
openness or trade connection.
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1. Introduction
The gravity model of bilateral trade is of primary importance in empirical analyses of
trade patterns. Its simplest version states that trade interactions between two geograph-
ically defined economic entities (either countries or regions) are proportional to the size
of these entities and inversely related to the distance between them (Combes, 2008).
The model has been used to further understand the underpinnings of trade flows in
general, as well as the role of their particular determinants such as distance, borders,
currency unions, WTO membership, insecurity, institutions and a host of others. (Hen-
derson and Millimet, 2008). According to the empirical findings, proximity is the main
engine of trade between spatially distinct economic entities. Although this could a priori
appear as an obsolete view of the world if one believes in the “death of distance” or
the emergence of the “global village” (McLuhan and Fiore, 1968; Combes et al., 2008),
there is a widespread reliance on the gravity model based both on its solid theoretical
foundation, derived from several underlying theories (see, for instance, Anderson, 1979;
Deardorff, 1998; Evenett and Keller, 2002) and the fact that it has proven empirically
successful—explaining much of the variation in trade volume over time and space. In
their meta-analysis study, Disdier and Head (2008) found that halving distance increased
trade by 45%, and more recent analyses by these authors suggest that the distance effect
has actually increased in recent years.
Based on these ideas, some authors such as Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) state that
the gravity model provides “some of the clearest and most robust empirical findings in
economics” (Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995, p.1384), whereas others such as Rose (2000)
note that the gravity model provides a “framework with a long track record of success”
(Rose, 2000, p.11). Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) concur: “The gravity equation
is one of the most empirically successful in economics” (Anderson and van Wincoop,
2003, p.170). This successful performance of the gravity model for explaining bilateral
flows has been recently boosted by the availability of a growing number of “natural
experiments” in the form of regional trade agreements (Greenaway and Milner, 2002).
As recognized by the literature on international trade, the standard gravity models
usually estimated are unable to capture the significant decline in trade costs brought
about by the globalization of the world economy. These ideas were initially noted by
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Leamer and Levinsohn (1995), who stated that “the effect of distance on trade patterns
is not diminishing over time. Contrary to popular impression, the world is not getting
dramatically smaller”. Some authors refer to this as the “missing globalization puzzle”
(Coe et al., 2002, 2007). Other recent proposals referred to it as “the conservation of
distance in international trade” (Berthelon and Freund, 2008), or “the puzzling persis-
tence of the distance effect on bilateral trade” (Disdier and Head, 2008). The question is
even more strongly posed when asking whether “distance has died” (Brun et al., 2005),
or when stating that “it is alive and well” (Carrere and Schiff, 2005). The number of
studies on the issue is substantial. Disdier and Head (2008) provide a useful summary.
In their meta-analysis, they conclude that the estimated negative impact of distance on
trade rose around the middle of the twentieth century and has remained persistently
high since then, with the result holding even after controlling for the heterogeneity in
samples and methods across studies.
This debate in the specific area of international economics on the relevance of dis-
tance already existed from a more general point of view. In 2005 Thomas Friedman
published an influential book, in which he argued that the world is becoming rapidly
“flatter”, basing his argument on 10 major political, economic and technological phe-
nomena. Although, as indicated by Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi (2008), Friedman’s
“personal eureka” was not particularly new,1 it renewed the debate on the topic, as
shown by the enormous boost in the number of publications which followed the publi-
cation of his book.2
In this paper we suggest yet another approach to the “missing globalization puz-
zle” in the gravity equation. We build on Arribas et al. (2009), who construct indices
of international trade integration taking into account some relevant ideas somewhat
“forgotten” by the international economics literature, namely, the Standard of Perfect
International Integration devised by Frankel (2000), and the concept of geographic neu-
trality (Kunimoto, 1977; Krugman, 1996). Considering also some ideas derived from
network analysis theory, whose importance for trade has been recently revealed by Kali
1Some other previous and relevant contributions, as suggested by Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi (2008),
referred to the topic as the “end of geography” (O’brien, 1992), the “death of distance” (Cairncross, 1997),
or the emergence of a “space of flows” (Castells, 1998), or of a “weightless economy” (Quah, 1996).
2See, for instance, some interesting contributions in the Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society,
mostly made by geographers, such as Christopherson et al. (2008), McCann (2008), Linders et al. (2008),
Brakman and van Marrewijk (2008), or Cox (2008).
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and Reyes (2007), Arribas et al. (2009) construct an indicator of international trade inte-
gration made up of two components that take into account how open to trade and how
connected economies are.
Our approach to the better understanding of the missing globalization puzzle is
based on a modified version of the indicators of integration proposed by Arribas et al.
(2009). Motivated by the robust empirical regularity that bilateral trade flows between
pairs of countries are explained well by the product of their gross domestic products
(GDPs) and, very importantly, by their bilateral distance, we include the latter when
building our measures of trade integration. Specifically, we construct indicators for
which both inter-country and intra-country distances are taken into account, since both
are relevant for countries’ imports and exports as documented not only by the litera-
ture on gravity equations (in the case of inter-country distances) but also by Alesina
and Spolaore (1997) (in the case of intra-country distances) and, in general, the liter-
ature on the “home market effect” hypothesis (big countries produce more of goods
with scale economies). The comparison of both sets of indices (distance-corrected and
distance-uncorrected) enables us to carry out a new assessment of the role of distance
for determining international trade flows.
In contrast to the literature cited above, one of the main advantages of our approach
is its ability to enable the effect of distance to vary across countries, considering them
individually. Although the idea is not entirely new for geographers, it has barely been
explored in the context of trade. A recent contribution which combines ideas from both
economic geography and trade is the paper by Boulhol and de Serres (2010), which
applies the framework developed by Redding and Venables (2004) on a panel dataset
restricted to advanced countries only over the 1970–2004 period. One of their main
findings is that the cost of remoteness remains significant. This is a remarkable finding
with respect to those of Redding and Venables (2004) which, according to Boulhol and de
Serres (2010), led to the false impression that developed countries have escaped the curse
of distance. According to Boulhol and de Serres (2010), this occurs because “a cross-
section that mixes both low- and high-income countries cannot satisfactorily control for
the wide differences in the level of technical efficiency, which drastically biases upwards
the sensitivity of GDP per capita to proximity to markets”. However, although the study
by Boulhol and de Serres (2010) partly addresses the issue that the effect of remoteness
3
varies across countries, they only do this partially because countries are clustered into
different groups within which heterogeneity is remarkable.
Several geographers have acknowledged this reality (i.e., that the context is critical
for the validity of results) from a different point of view. Followers of Casetti (1972, 1991)
observed in the nineties that the effect of distance varies across countries. This was a
specific finding within the more general setting of the expansion method, according to
which an explanation (to the extent that it can be achieved) depends on the context.
After the initial impetus by Casetti, there was a remarkable increase in research using
contextual quantitative models, moving away from traditional approaches which “de-
nied geography” (Jones and Bullen, 1994).3 However, the literature has evolved since
Jones and Casetti’s contributions and, more recently, geographers have shifted to meth-
ods such as geographically weighted regression (Fotheringham et al., 2002).
Our proposal is to merge the ways of approaching the globalization puzzle from
these two fields of research, i.e., from the trade literature and from the geography liter-
ature.4 Our approach is particularly effective for dealing with this question because of
its ability to construct country-specific indicators of integration with two variants, one
which controls for distance and another one that assumes frictionless trade. Therefore,
one may identify those countries for which the effect of distance on their trade integra-
tion is higher and, in a second stage, to discover some of the covariates that can affect
this pattern.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the methodolog-
ical contents of our approach to measure international trade integration, including the
estimation method for the distance effect. Section 3 presents the data set and Section
4 the empirical application, by considering data on exports of goods for a wide set of
countries that account for most of world output and trade, and for a relatively long
sample period (1967–2005). Section 5 explores the determinants of the discrepancies be-
tween the original and distance-corrected trade integration indicators. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
3Eldridge and Jones (1991) are very forceful about this point, stating that “(the distance) parameter has
been assumed to be stable across the range of destinations toward which flows are directed. This is a heroic
assumption, however, since it suggests that the effect of distance out of a particular origin is unmodified in
spite of the diversity of places within the spatial system”.
4Some recent papers have partly dealt with this issue. For instance, Andresen (2010), with more general
aims, summarizes geographers’ contributions on trade (we thank a referee for this suggestion).
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2. Defining distance-corrected integration indicators
Trade openness is not directly observable and there is no theoretical agreement or ac-
cepted standard about how to measure it (Epstein et al., 2007). The literature has grown
up proposing and evaluating alternative measures to capture this concept, which have
been summarized by Proudman et al. (1997), among others. One of the most widespread
alternatives are ex post measures such as export shares.5 Although these measures have
some disadvantages derived from endogeneity in growth regressions and related con-
texts, given their popularity and straightforwardness we choose them as an initial ap-
proach to measure openness and, therefore, the first component of international trade
integration that we consider is a modified version of one of the most standard ex post
measures of trade integration, namely, total trade (exports, X, plus imports, M, divided
by GDP, i.e., (X +M)/GDP).
We argue that trade openness is only but one component of trade integration. If we
think of world trade as a network where the nodes are countries and the ties are trade
flows among them, we can construct a second component derived from the inclusion
of the structure of the current trade relations between countries—what some authors
have labeled the “architecture” of trade flows (Kali and Reyes, 2007), or the World Trade
Web (WTW). Relevant aspects of this architecture would include the number of trade
partners, the proportionality of trade flows to the size of the partners, and the role of
barriers—particulary distance.
In order to characterize a benchmark of trade integration which controls for the ex-
istence of a world trade network, we define an extension of the concept of geographic
neutrality (Kunimoto, 1977; Krugman, 1996; Iapadre, 2006) closely related to the Stan-
dard of Perfect International Integration (SPII) by Frankel (2000): “geographically neu-
tral” trade exists when country B’s share of A’s exports is equal to B’s share of gross
world product outside A (Krugman, 1996, p.64). This geographic neutrality concept, as
we will show later, is deeply rooted in the latest theoretical developments of the gravity
5Proudman et al. (1997) consider two additional strands for measuring trade openness. The second
strand is outcome-based, which evaluates the gap between the actual outcome and the potential outcome
without trade barriers, using trade intensity (Leamer, 1988) or price distortion (Pritchett, 1996) measures.
The third strand is the incidence-based approach, which attempts to measure openness by direct observation
of trade restrictions such as average tariff rates, non-tariff barriers, black market exchange rates, central
planning or state monopolies in major exports.
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literature, which refers to the trade predictions of a hypothetic frictionless (trade) world.
Moreover, our notion of integration is the same as the SPII by Arribas et al. (2009) in that
it also verifies the properties of domestic neutrality, direct international neutrality and
size, but differs in the consideration of distance as a key factor. More precisely, our
definition of SPII integrates the Samuelson’s (1954) standard iceberg assumptions, as we
consider that the flow between two economies is not only proportional to their relative
sizes but also depends inversely on the distance between the economies. In short, under
our neutrality assumption the following properties must be verified:
Domestic neutrality: An economy whose domestic demand is proportional to its
share of the world economy will have a higher level of integration.
Direct international neutrality: An economy that balances its direct relations with
another individual economy, in proportion to their sizes and inversely to their distances,
will have a higher level of integration.
Size: The larger the economy is, the more relevant its integration will be for world
integration.
In order to analyze the extent to which economies meet the two properties mentioned
above, we must define an integration index and measure the gap between the current
level of integration and the SPII. We will proceed in three stages, each one defining
different indicators.
2.1. Controlling for distance
Taking as starting point the integration indicators defined in Arribas et al. (2009), we
introduce some variations to allow for the effect of the distance. Let N be the set of
economies and let i and j be typical members of this set. Let Yi be the size of economy
i ∈ N, for example its GDP, dij the geographic distance between the economies i and
j, and dii economy i’s internal distance. In order to compare economies that are not
contiguous, we follow Samuelson’s standard “iceberg” assumption considering that if an
economy j of size Yj gets as close to economy i as possible, then its size will be reduced
to Yj/d
θ
ij (i.e., as stated by Samuelson (1954), “only a fraction of ice exported reaches
its destination as unmelted ice”), where θ is a non-negative parameter which measures
the impact of distance (the farther away economies are, the greater the reduction, with
an intensity that depends on the θ parameter). In the extreme case in which θ = 0 the
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“iceberg” effect fades away.
We define ai as country i’s share of world GDP, i.e., ai = Yi/∑j∈N Yj. We define ri as
the economy i’s relative weight with respect to a world economy where the correction by
distance has been performed (distance corrected world) i.e., ri = (Yi/d
θ
ii)/∑j∈N(Yj/d
θ
ij).
Notice that: (i) we also consider that there exists an iceberg effect on the domestic econ-
omy (due to countries’ differing geographic sizes) or, equivalently, that distance-related
trade costs exist both for inter- and intra-national trade; (ii) the above definition does not
depend on the units of measurement for the distance between economies given that ri
can be written as ri = Yi/∑j∈N(Yj/(dij/dii)θ). This expression allows the effect of the ge-
ographic distance to be re-interpreted as the one given by a normalized distance matrix
between economies where every internal distance of the economies is 1 and the distance
from economy i to economy j is dij/dii, the times the geographic distance between these
economies is bigger than the economy i’s internal distance; and (iii) the impact of the
distance depends on the θ parameter. In a world where distance is irrelevant, θ = 0
(geographic neutrality) and ri = ai.
Given a measurable relationship between economies, we define the flow Xij as the
intensity of this relationship between economies i and j. The flow between economies
can be evaluated through either the imports or the exports of goods, capital, or any other
flow measured in the same units as Yi. Moreover, in general the flow will be asymmetric,
so that Xij will not necessarily be equal to Xji, for all i, j ∈ N. Since the trade openness
measure already captures the overall orientation towards the trade of a country, the
connectedness of an economy will not take into account the inner flows. All definitions
in the paper hinge on the flow considered to measure international integration.
2.2. Definitions
Our approach to measure integration proceeds in three stages, defining indicators of
trade distance-corrected counterparts to those presented in Arribas et al. (2009).6 First,
we present the degree of openness; second, we present the degree of balanced connec-
tion; third, we combine both indicators to construct a single degree of trade integration
for each country. In all three cases the indicators are constructed for both the sce-
6Although the definitions build on Arribas et al. (2009), all the materials presented here are self-
contained.
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nario of geographic neutrality (also zero-gravity or frictionless trade) and the scenario
in which distance matters, and where we are still far from a “flat world” (Friedman,
2005) or the “global village” (McLuhan and Fiore, 1968). According to the distance-
uncorrected indicators, the spatial separation of nations and regions should be of little
importance in economic life, whereas according to the distance-corrected indicators it
is still an important impediment for international trade integration. Therefore, we are
contributing in a different way to the set of tools offered by economic geography to un-
earthing some of the complex interactions between globalization and spatial inequalities
(Combes et al., 2008, p.365). One of the most relevant features of our indicators is that
they are country-specific and, consequently, we can temper the statement by Leamer
(2007), who claimed that “physically, culturally, and economically, the world is not flat”
(Leamer, 2007, p.123). According to the indicators we present below, this sentence does
not equally apply to all countries and, therefore we recommend adding “on average”
either at the beginning or the end.
Degree of openness
First we characterize the degree of openness assuming that output is not domestically-
biased—i.e., it is not biased towards domestic demand. In order to remove the domestic
(or home) bias we define Ŷi as the flow from economy i to the world controlling for the
weight in the distance-corrected world economy of the economy under analysis: namely,
Ŷi = Yi − riYi. Then, we define the relative flow or degree of openness:
Definition 1 Given an economy i ∈ N, we define its degree of openness, DOθi , as
DOθi =
∑j∈N Xij
Ŷi
. (1)
We write DOθ instead of DOθi when general statements on the degree of openness
are being made, or references to the variable itself, which do not hang on any specific
economy. The same rule applies to the other indicators.
Degree of balanced connection
In the second stage we analyze the “trade architecture” (Kali and Reyes, 2007), i.e.,
whether the connection of one economy with others is proportional to their sizes in
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terms of GDP,7 or whether this connection does not show geographical neutrality. Thus,
we define the degree of balanced connection (DBC) to measure the discrepancy between the
trade volumes in the real world and those corresponding to the SPII.
In the trade network, the relative flow from country i to country j in terms of the
total flow of country i, αij, is given by
αij =
Xij
∑j∈N Xij
(2)
(recall that we are assuming Xii = 0). Let A = (αij) be the square matrix of relative
flows: the component ij of matrix A is αij.
We consider that the distance-corrected world trade web is perfectly connected if
the flow (exports) between two countries is proportional to their relative sizes (geo-
graphically neutral trade). Thus, if the world trade is neutral (which, following the SPII
nomenclature, would be a “perfectly connected world economy”), then the flow from i
to j should be equal to βijŶi, where
βij =
Yj/d
θ
ij
∑k∈N\i(Yk/dθik)
(3)
is the relative weight of economy j in a distance-corrected world where economy i is not
considered.
Note that ∑j∈N\i βij = 1 and that βij is the degree of openness between countries i
and j in the “perfectly connected world” (i.e., the world in which trade is geographically
neutral), with βii = 0. Let B = (βij) be the square matrix of degrees of openness in the
geographically neutral trade world (“perfectly connected world”). The literature on the
gravity equation considers similar ideas, although it refers to them in a different way
since in the absence of trade costs it is possible to predict trade for the frictionless world.
More simply, we can refer to this scenario as the frictionless trade.
Analogously to the degree of openness, we construct the distance corrected degree
of balanced connection, as follows:
Definition 2 Given an economy i ∈ N, we define the degree of balance connection of i,
7The dependence of both the number and magnitude of exchanges on economy size is the focus of
international trade analyses based on gravity models and widely used in the literature (Hummels and
Levinsohn, 1995; Feenstra et al., 1998, 2001; Rauch, 1999).
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DBCθi , as
DBCθi =
∑j∈N αijβij√
∑j∈N
(
αij
)2√
∑j∈N
(
βij
)2 . (4)
Degree of integration
We construct the degree of integration by combining the degree of openness and the
degree of balanced connection defined above as follows:
Definition 3 Given an economy i ∈ N, we define its degree of integration, DIi, as
DIθi =
√
min{DOθi , 1/DOθi }·DBCθi (5)
In all three cases (DOθ, DBCθ and DIθ), the cases where θ = 0 refer to distance-
uncorrected indicators, whereas those in which θ = 1 are distance-corrected indicators.
Note that for both components of DI we set limits on the integration level achieved.8
This has to be done because of some extreme observations. In relation with the gravity
equations literature, our indicators consider its two main regressors: namely, the size of
the trading partners and the distance between them. Therefore, one of the advantages
of our approach is that, instead of providing us with information as to whether these
variables are important for trade flows, it will be possible to measure the gap from the
scenario of complete trade integration (frictionless trade, or geographic neutral trade)
and the current level of integration, under different hypotheses as to the impact of
distance.
To characterize the integration of the world economy as a whole, we should consider
the share of each economy in the world, ai, to define the global indicators as follow,
DGOθ = ∑
i∈N
aiDO
θ
i , (6)
DGBCθ = ∑
i∈N
aiDBC
θ
i , (7)
DGIθ = ∑
i∈N
aiDI
θ
i . (8)
The DGIθ is the most general quantitative aproximation of the international integra-
8We admit the way to combine both partial indices (DOθ and DBCθ) is somewhat ad hoc. However, our
main point is that it is important for trade integration to consider both effects, regardless of the way they
are combined.
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tion of economies, as it considers the degree of openness as well as the distribution and
size of the flows between economies.
3. Data presentation
For computing the different indicators presented in the previous section we need in-
formation on trade flows, output (measured using GDP) and distances, both between
countries (external) and within countries (internal). All these variables are drawn from
the data set Comptes Harmonisés sur les Echanges et l’Economie Mondiale, or Harmonised
Accounts on Trade and The World Economy (CHELEM), a database which is available
at URL http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/chelem.htm (data compiled by CEPII,
Paris). Although this database is perhaps not the most popular in trade studies, its use is
convenient because it includes different types of information for most of the countries in
the database, covering a long time period. Apart from the variables needed to compute
the indicators presented in Section 2, it also contains other relevant information such as
population, specialization (in exports), data on services, etc.
Our data sample corresponds to 59 countries accounting for 96.7% of world output
and 86.5% of international trade in 2005. Table 1 shows the list of countries considered,
which includes all large economies. Both developed and developing countries are also
included, and the geographic origin of the different countries is heterogeneous—there
are countries from all continents. The variable selected to measure the flows between
countries is the volume of exports. The computations for indicators based on imports
do not alter the average general results, although they may differ for some specific
countries.9
Our sample period stretches from 1967 to 2005, covering entirely what some au-
thors have labeled the second wave of globalization (Maddison, 2001; O’Rourke and
Williamson, 2002). Using information for such a long time period (39 years) comes at
a price, namely, the fact that some countries have to be excluded. Should we constrain
the analysis to a shorter time period, the number of countries included in the study
could increase. This trade-off between the number of countries in the sample and the
length of the analyzed period can be partly overcome by choosing a sufficiently repre-
9These results are not reported due to space limitations (it would basically double the space devoted to
the results), but are available from the authors upon request.
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sentative sample—in terms of both world output and trade—which is what we finally
did. Moreover, as indicated by Redding and Schott (2003), in some circumstances it may
be problematic to include a high number of countries because results could be driven
by small countries that trade very little with the rest of the world. However, we admit
that another alternative—i.e., choosing more countries and less years—would also yield
relevant results.
The same institution that provides data on trade flows and GDP also supplies other
relevant pieces of required information crucial for this study, such as distance. Two
types of distances are considered. The distance from country i to country j (external
distance, dij) is measured by the distance (great circle distance) between the main city of
the country which, in most cases, is the capital of the country.10 The data set also pro-
vides information on internal or intra-national distances (dii). Those employed here are
based on areas, and they are necessary for constructing the distance-corrected indices.
We measure it via an often used measure of average distance between producers and
consumers in a country (Head and Mayer, 2002):
dii = .67
√
area/pi (9)
where area is country i’s area in square km. However, as indicated by Head and
Mayer (2002), there has been little consensus on the appropriate measure of internal
10In some cases such as France the same city accomplishes simultaneously the criteria of being the capital,
the largest city and a centrally located large city. However, there are a number of cases in our sample for
which the economic center differs from the capital: South Africa (The Cap), Germany (Essen), Australia
(Sydney), Brazil (São Paulo), Canada (Toronto), United States (New York, although in practice most studies
use Chicago) and Turkey (Istanbul).
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distance.11,12 Ideally, an accurate measure of internal distance should include informa-
tion on the key points of entry of trade into the country, the quality of the infrastructure,
or the modes of transport. Unfortunately, such information is not available for all coun-
tries in our sample.
Using data on internal distances opens an intriguing and relatively unexplored de-
bate, since the number of studies venturing into how intra-national distances affect trade
is much lower than the number of studies focusing on external distances only. Yet we
must admit that a specific analysis of how differently inter-national and intra-national
distances affect trade is an issue that goes beyond the aims of this paper where we ad-
dress this issue only partly. As indicated in section 2, defining distance-corrected shares
of country i’s GDP as ri = (Yi/d
θ
ii)/∑j∈N(Yj/d
θ
ij) has several advantages—i.e., we factor
in the iceberg effect, and the results do not depend on the units of measurement.
The distance-corrected relative weights, ri (which are also available upon request), as
expected, differ from those for distance-uncorrected relative weights, ai for all countries,
but the magnitude of the discrepancies varies ostensibly across countries. Given the way
to construct the ri parameter, it will depend not only on how far countries are located
from their trade partners but also on the magnitude of their internal distances obtained
via Equation (9). For instance, by 2005 the U.S. share of world (sample) GDP (aUSA =
11Although the measure proposed in Equation (9) lies within the group of area-based measures, the early
papers in the literature employed fractions of distances to the centers of neighbor countries (Wei, 1996; Wolf,
2000), which were criticized by Nitsch (2000b), among others, soon afterwards. Apart from our area-based
measure, there are other interesting proposals within this family. For instance, Nitsch (2000b) and Leamer
(1997) use the radius of a hypothetical disk (i.e.,
√
area/pi), Redding and Venables (2004) link intra-country
transport costs to the area of the country by using the formula dii = .33
√
area/pi. Years before Keeble et al.
(1988) relied on the same formula– whereas Helliwell and Verdier (2001) consider internal distances of cities
which are represented as square grids, employing the formula dii ≈ .52
√
area. Finally, one can use actual
data on the spatial distribution of economic activity within nations rather than working with geometric
approximations, yielding sub-unit based weighted averages. Following Head and Mayer (2002), one may
conclude that a desirable measure of internal distance might be calculated either directly using sub-national
data on the geographic distribution of activity, or by making various simplifying assumptions. According
to the comparison of measures performed by Nitsch (2000a), the area-based approximations (such as the
one we employ) are fine indicators of the averages of sub-national distances, which makes our choice
reasonable.
12Regarding the use of the 0.67 constant, the intra-national distances we use are derived from the fol-
lowing hypotheses (Head and Mayer, 2002): (i) the economic geography of each country is approximated
with a disk in which the production concentrates at the center, and (ii) consumers are randomly distributed
throughout the rest of the area. Under these assumptions, the average distance between a producer and
a consumer is given by dii =
∫ R
0 r f (r)dr, where R is the radius of the disk, and f (r) is the density of the
consumers at any given distance r. If the area of the country is A, then we obtain R equal to
√
A/pi. The
uniform density distribution corresponds to f (r) = 2r/R2. Then,dii =
∫ R
0 2r
2/R2dr = (2/3)r3/R2|R0 =
(2/3)R = (2/3)
√
A/pi. In other words, in the hypothetical country, a representative consumer is located
at a distance of 0.67 from the center of the disk.
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29.01%) was almost three times that of Japan (aJapan = 10.67%). However, the distance-
corrected shares of world GDP are much closer (rUSA = 63.99% and rJapan = 78.04%),
since the effects of dij and dii on ri are opposite, and the intra-national distances for the
U.S. are higher than those for Japan.
Our analysis is restricted to trade in goods only. Since specialization patterns vary
across countries, there is a bias for our indices which will affect countries differently.
However, extending the analysis to account for trade in services is not possible, since
there are no services equivalent to the matrix of trade in goods between country pairs.
4. Results
Results for the degree of global openness (DGOθ=0 and DGOθ=1) correspond to the evo-
lution of the weighted mean in both upper panels of Figure 1 (Figure 1.a). They are also
reported in Table 2. The values are reported explicitly given our specific interest in mea-
suring trade integration. On average, the degree of openness has more than doubled for
DGOθ=0 and almost tripled for DGOθ=1 from 1967 to 2005. It would suggest how open
the world economy is, and it is apparent that if we acknowledge that distance matters
(including it explicitly to construct the indicators), the level of openness is higher. In
both instances, however, the degree of openness advances at a similar pace: in the econ-
omy where distance is irrelevant (DGOθ=0) the increase is from 8.03% to 20.84%, and
when location matters (DGOθ=1), the increase is higher (from 12.13% to 32.27%). How-
ever, the analysis by subperiods discloses additional results: for DGOθ=0, the highest
increase took place after 1986, whereas for DGOθ=1 it occurred before. This finding may
be explained by the role of countries such as Japan, which is big in GDP terms (therefore
its behavior affects the evolution of DGO), which is distant, and whose DOi increased
sharply before 1986.
Figure 1.b displays results for the degree of balanced connection under the two sce-
narios (DGBCθ=0, DGBCθ=1). The most apparent feature is that they are much closer
to the economies’ theoretical full potential (100%) for connection than DOθ, particu-
larly when distance matters (θ = 1). However, the average increases have been more
modest than in the degree of openness case, also because initial levels were already
high. These tendencies are common under geographic neutrality (θ = 0) and θ = 1,
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although the increase has been even more modest in this last case. The values corre-
sponding to the degree of global balanced connection DGBC are also reported in Table
2. In contrast to the result obtained for the degree of openness, the wealthier countries
(as indicated by the weighted mean) are those with the highest degrees of balanced
connection. These values peaked before the 1990s. The most interesting results, how-
ever, emerge when dropping the physical irrelevance assumption and distance enters
the analysis, for which all countries lie above DBC = 70%. Therefore, once the down-
ward impact of distance on the volume of trade is controlled for, countries export more
“proportionally” to the size of their trading partners. In other words, if as found and
predicted by gravity models distance matters, and its importance does not seem to di-
minish sharply over time despite the decline in transportation costs, the current level of
balanced connections would already be high. However, the balance would be lessened
from the perspective of a global village, where the role of remoteness disappears.
The degree of integration results from combining the effects of the DGO and the
DGBC. The evolution of the basic summary statistics is reported in Figure 1.c. The
relevant message is not only that it indicates the level of international trade integration
achieved by each country but, more importantly, that it indicates how far each country
is from its theoretical full potential for integration. Although there are some excep-
tions to the rule, countries are generally more integrated when controlling for distance,
when their degree of integration decreases. The interpretation of these particular cases
is straightforward: these are countries whose exports suffer from a “distance bias”,
since the major trading partners for these countries are remotely located—i.e., in the
case of distance being relevant, they should export more to their geographic neighbors.
Therefore, it is obvious that this type of result only arises for countries sharing several
characteristics, among which we might consider the fact of being surrounded by devel-
oping countries (e.g., Algeria, Gabon, Nigeria, Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Chile) or
being highly exporting countries whose trading partners are physically distant (China,
Malaysia and Singapore). However, there are also political reasons involved. If countries
are members of a regional trade agreement (usually with physically-close nations), there
will exist a bias to trade more with other members. In contrast, in some particular cases
there is bias to trade less with neighbors: for historical and political reasons, there are
countries which trade relatively little with one another in spite of being physically close.
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In our sample, some examples would include Japan-South Korea, or India-Pakistan. In
addition, for many of our sample years, former European communist countries could
barely trade with their Western neighbors.
The specific values for the degree of global integration (DGI) are reported in Table
2. The general assessment of the level of world integration (DGI) as of 2005 is that, in
the case of distance still being relevant, we are already halfway to the theoretical full po-
tential for global trade integration. However, from the perspective of the global village,
where distance becomes an irrelevancy, the process is still in a previous stage, since the
degree of global integration decreases sharply (from 50.96% to 35.48%). Yet the range
of possible particular behaviors is broad: the standard deviation (not reported) has in-
creased sharply (although the coefficient of variation has declined due to the growing
average), and probability mass becomes increasingly spread, suggesting that some coun-
tries are quite close to the unity, yet many others are still far—although the prevailing
picture is that trade integration is advancing.
5. Analyzing the determinants of the distance trade bias
Figure 2 provides a preliminary view on the changing role of distance over the 1967–
2005 period. It shows the evolution of the DGOθ=1/DGOθ=0, DGBCθ=1/DGBCθ=0
and DGIθ=1/DGIθ=0 ratios, which is disparate. Whereas all three indicators departed
from similar values (ranging in the ]1.4, 1.6[ interval), the DGOθ=1/DGOθ=0 increased
until the mid nineties, and then decreased to virtually the initial value. The evolu-
tion of the DGBCθ=1/DGBCθ=0 has been the opposite, but much more attenuated.
DGIθ=1/DGIθ=0 shows their combined effect.
Given the length of the period (39 years) and the heterogeneity of countries making
up our sample, the reasons explaining the behavior of all three indices will be multi-
ple, complex and, as we have been pointing out from the introduction, country-specific
(Jones, 1992). Some particular countries such as South Africa, China or the European
countries belonging to the former Eastern Bloc, to name but a few, have gone through
significant political change, which in most cases has affected trade significantly.
However, some of the trends in Figure 2 could be partly explained away by relevant
events which have intensified over the last few years. It is worth noting the fact that
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the tendencies for DO and DBC have evolved in opposite directions. Considering that
an indicator of 1 implies that distance is irrelevant, according to the DO its importance
increased until the mid nineties. This could be related to the fact that over the last fifty
years an increasing number of remote countries have started to trade more intensively.
Since the mid nineties, when regional trade agreements have bloomed the tendencies
have reversed. This could be related to the fact that our degree of openness partly reflects
trade creation (countries adhering to regional trade agreements trade more) whereas the
degree of balanced connection partly reflects trade diversion (if members of a given RTA
trade more among themselves, their DBC should probably decrease).13 A proper inves-
tigation into the determinants of these discrepancies requires less speculative approach.
We consider that large discrepancies among distance-corrected and uncorrected val-
ues of our trade integration indicators constitute an equivalent to the persistence of the
distance coefficient in gravity equations. The basic version of these models considers
that trade between country i and a number of partner countries j, Tij, is a function of
GDP of both country i (Yi) and country j (Yj), and geographic distance between the two
countries, DISTij. Therefore, the following model and the like are generally estimated,
lnTij = β0 + β1ln(DISTij) + β2ln(Yi) + β3ln(Yj) + ε ij (10)
where ε ij is the error term. The right-hand side in Equation (10) is usually enlarged so
as to control for variables such as common language, land border, colonizer, the condi-
tion of being landlocked, the existence of a free trade area, and sometimes a common
currency.
As it has been documented throughout the paper, discrepancies among distance-
corrected and distance-uncorrected trade integration indicators vary a great deal both
on average but, most importantly, across countries. This would imply that the effect of
distance is not homogeneous across countries and therefore the estimated β1’s in Equa-
tion (10) might be country-dependent implying that, when dealing with the issue as to
whether “distance has died” or not, we should temper the statements by also adding
that distance is still significant on average. Some authors have indeed pointed out that
13However, the line of reasoning is intricate. As indicated by Wonnacott (1996), regional free trade
agreements might be better than what is usually predicted when they are formed or expand, and worse
when they multiply.
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nonlinearity may be the problem. For instance, Coe et al. (2007) estimate a gravity equa-
tion with an additive error term and find that there was some decline in the distance
coefficient. Other authors also point out this varying effect across countries, by consid-
ering that geographic distance is a proxy for unfamiliarity and that exporters in high
uncertainty-aversion countries are more sensitive to informational ambiguity (Huang,
2007). However, there have been few initiatives so far to measure how relevant the
distance effect is for each specific country. Following the ideas presented in the in-
troduction, some authors warn explicitly about the dangers of “attempting to apply
generalizations about human action gained from aggregate data, which summarize the
overall acts of a large number of heterogeneous people, to make inferences about how
individuals act” (Sheppard, 1984).
Table 3 illustrates the severity of this problem. It shows the discrepancies between
both DBCθ=0 and DBCθ=1 for some particular countries. The left panel lists countries for
which distance matters, as revealed by large discrepancies between distance-corrected
(DBCθ=1) and uncorrected (DBCθ=0) indices. For most countries in this list the values of
DBC are almost doubled when controlling for the distance separating them from their
trading partners. This is an interesting illustration of the iceberg effect. The relatively
low values found for the European Union countries in the list indicate they trade less
proportionally than what frictionless trade would predict. Should they trade more pro-
portionally to the economic size of their trading partners, the indicator would increase.
The range of possible explanations will be of course much wider, and probably more
complex. However, Table 3 stresses clearly that the magnitude and significance of the
distance parameter in gravity equations should be assessed with care, and it is perhaps
convenient to evaluate it within the setting of Casetti’s (1972) expansion method.
Controlling for distance (θ = 1) implies assuming that “only a fraction of ice ex-
ported reaches its destination as unmelted ice”, as stated earlier. This is equivalent to
assuming that trading partners in distant locations become smaller when bringing them
closer to the exporting country. In the case of the European Union countries, large
economies such as Japan or the U.S. would become much smaller, implying that, ac-
cording to geographic neutral trade, we can expect that European countries trade less
with them—which is precisely the case. Once distance is removed via the iceberg ef-
fect, Japan and the U.S. are not large countries anymore from a European geographical
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position and therefore the DBC of most European countries increases sharply.
In contrast, the right panel in Table 3 lists some countries for which distance is
not as relevant, as shown by low discrepancies between DBCθ=0i and DBC
θ=1
i . This
indicates that the countries in the list trade according to the predictions of geographic
neutral trade. In some cases the values found for DBC when controlling for distance are
even lower than those found under frictionless trade. This indicates that these countries
(Chile, China, India, Nigeria) trade “too much” (according to the geographic neutrality
standard) with distant countries, or not enough with their neighbors.
We explore some covariates which could contribute to explaining this varying role of
distance for the different countries in the sample. However, the list of covariates is not
exhaustive. We are especially constrained by the fact that, whereas gravity equations try
to explain variability in bilateral trade flows, for which they include distance regressors,
in our case distance is endogenous. This constrains both the number an nature of the
variables that can be included as regressors. Some of them are variables that capture
the existence of regional trade agreements. Although there is a wide range of different
forms of integration arrangements, including free trade areas, customs unions, and pref-
erential trading areas, we use RTAs as a generic descriptor following the proposals by
Greenaway and Milner (2002). Some authors consider regionalism might enhance short-
distance trade and therefore be the most obvious explanation for the non-declining role
of distance (Berthelon and Freund, 2008), whereas technological improvements might
favor long-distance trade. Indeed, Hummels (1999) finds that containerization reduced
the relative cost of distance. As indicated by Alesina and Spolaore (1997), trade blocs
(which they label as political integration) harm economic integration, accounting for
why economic integration is usually found to be low for members of free trade agree-
ments.
In spite of being currently more, we consider only the most important RTAs: namely,
the European Union, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN. These are major RTAs in Eu-
rope, America and Asia, although a relatively small but growing number apply to the
trade of developing countries. Most applications of the gravity model have also searched
for evidence of actual or potential effects by adding dummy variables for membership
of a particular RTA. We add a related variable whose importance is not always consid-
ered by the literature: namely, the number of years each country has been member of its
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corresponding RTA. By including this dummy variable, we will be able to test whether
there is an identifiable RTA effect, and to recognize those variables on which the RTAs’
dummies may have stronger effects. In addition, it constitutes a good proxy for the
depth of the commercial links between the different trading partners.
We also include in our regressions the GDP of each country—recall that since we
have constructed country-specific indicators we do not use bilateral information. Gravity
equations generally find that the economic size of each partner is a significant explana-
tory variable for the trade volumes between them. In our specific setting, the equivalent
result would be that country i’s GDP is significant. Not only has the general literature
on gravity equations documented this issue but also Alesina and Spolaore (1997) among
others, who argue that bigger domestic markets constitute important incentives for large
countries to trade less. As also indicated by Brun et al. (2005), trade tends to constitute
a smaller percentage of GDP for larger countries. Some studies also include GDP per
capita. Although the impact is not entirely coincidental with that of GDP, due to the
high correlation between GDP and GDP per capita results tend to be similar. However,
given this high correlation between both covariates, it will not be possible to include
them in the models simultaneously.
We include in our regressions some of each country’s specialization patterns. There
is a vast literature on the effects of specialization on trade (see, for instance Redding,
2002; Redding and Schott, 2003; Schott, 2004). The changing composition of trade has
been found to be an explanation for the stability over time of the estimated distance
coefficients in gravity equations (Coe et al., 2002). As indicated by Berthelon and Fre-
und (2008), the increase in the importance of distance estimated using aggregate gravity
regressions could be due to an increase in the share of trade accounted by distance-
sensitive products. Indeed, these authors find that distance has become more important
for some industries. Thus, this information is crucial for explaining whether the effect of
distance is still there or not, since there are some products which will be traded intensely
regardless of where trading partners are located. In addition, in many cases the coun-
tries surrounding the main producers of these products have similar specializations,
which makes the role of distance even more prominent.
One of the most widely accepted indicators of a country’s trade specialization is the
Balassa (1965) “Revealed Comparative Advantage” (RCA) index (see further discussion
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in, for instance Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995), defined as:
RCAij =
Xij/∑j Xij
∑i Xij/∑i ∑j Xij
(11)
where the ratio in the numerator is the share of country j in sector i world exports,
whereas the ratio in the denominator represents the same share for total merchandise
exports. Those cases where the index takes values less than 1 indicate these are sectors
in which a country is relatively less specialized with respect to the world economy.
Values of the index greater than 1 denote sectors in which a country is relatively more
specialized with respect to the world economy. However, although this index has the
advantage of being a comprehensive indicator of the concept of specialization, there are
no clear theoretical foundations for this measure (Brasili et al., 2000).
Although it was possible to consider a sectoral classification with the highest level of
detail, our data covers 10 sectors, which coincides (in terms of number of sectors) with
previous studies such as Chen et al. (2009). We consider this is a reasonable balance,
since reducing the number of sectors would imply aggregating some relevant infor-
mation. These sectors include construction, basic metals, textiles, wood paper, metal
products, chemicals, mining, energy, agriculture, and food products. There is also a
miscellaneous category for the remainder.
We also include an indicator of remoteness in per capita income, following some of
the ideas and proposals by Nitsch (2000b). If we define the bilateral distance in GDP
between two countries i and j as drij = |Yi − Yj|, where Y represents the (log of) GDP
for each country, then the indicator of remoteness in per capita income for country i, Ri,
can be defined as:
Ri =
1
∑k∈N Nk/drik
(12)
where Nk represents the population of country k. Although the expected impact of
Ri on trade will be involved (it will probably be different for DO and DBC), one may
hypothesize that poor countries (which are remote in per capita income) will be less
affected by physical distance, since big markets are distant.
Therefore we estimate two basic models, since we analyze the impact of the selected
covariates on two of our three main indicators (openness and connection). Although the
analysis could also be extended to the degree of integration, the fact that it combines
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two indicators with different economic implications makes interpretation overly intri-
cate. Confining the analysis to the impact on the two components of trade integration
facilitates the readability of the paper. We also analyze some of their variants, by com-
bining the set of determinants in different ways. If we refer to the ratio Dθ=1/Dθ=0 as
the general expression for the three ratios DOθ=1/DOθ=0 and DBCθ=1/DBCθ=0, then
the model to be estimated presents the following general form:
Dθ=1it /D
θ=0
it = αi + β1GDPit + β2REMOTE_GDPit+
+ γ′ ∑
j
RCAijt + β3YRTAit + β4RTAit + ε it (13)
where GDPit will refer either to the logarithm of country i GDP, or per capita GDP
(which will not be considered simultaneously), in year t, REMOTE_GDPit is the re-
moteness in per capita GDP of country i, RCAijt is the Balassa Revealed Comparative
Advantage index for country i, sector j and year t, YRTAit is the number of years country
i is member of its corresponding RTA (if this applies) in year t, and RTAit is a dummy
variable which takes the value of 1 for countries members of the RTA considered. We
include the t subscript so as to account for the time dimension of the role of distance.
As indicated by Brun et al. (2005), there are potential problems when using cross-section
to estimate Equation (13) and the like. Some of these problems are related to the hetero-
geneity not captured by dummy variables, which could cause biased estimates. Others
are related to the omitted-variables bias to which typical ordinary least squares esti-
mates may be prone to. Therefore we estimate Equation (13) using cross-section fixed
effects, which are included in the αi parameter, so that the unobservable heterogeneity
is partly addressed.
However, the impact of the different RTAs on distance might be involved, since RTAs
differ in many respects. For instance, in Europe integration goes beyond merely estab-
lishing a free trade area, since both capital and labor can move freely and there is an
even more ambitious initiative for political integration with the European Constitution.
This is a big contrast with the features of NAFTA, where free flow of labor across mem-
ber states is not possible. Thus, we consider it relevant to analyze separately how each
particular RTA might affect distance by considering four simpler versions of Equation
(13) in which the RTA variable is substituted sequentially by EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, and
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MERCOSUR variables.
Table 4 shows estimation results for Equation (13) in which the dependent variable
is DOθ=1/DOθ=0, whereas Table 5 reports analogous information for DBCθ=1/DBCθ=0.
As indicated earlier, we estimate Equation (13) using cross-section fixed effects. Our
results report robust covariance matrix estimation. In the context of panel data, the
most general version of White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix
proves consistent against serial correlation as well. However, in the fixed effects case
the original White estimator turns out to be inconsistent in some particular cases (for
instance, for fixed T as n grows), so it may be more advisable to use the Arellano (1987)
version, which allows a fully general structure with respect to both heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation (Stock and Watson, 2008).14
Table 4 indicates that the effect of GDP on distance—as measured by larger discrep-
ancies among DOθ=1 and DOθ=0—is positive. This implies that for large economies
openness is strongly affected by distance, as heavily documented in the literature (home
market effect hypothesis). This coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% signifi-
cant level throughout. Both the sign and the significance of the coefficients hold when
including GDP per capita (GDP_PC) instead of GDP. As indicated earlier, one could a
priori forecast this result, given the usually high correlation between GDP and GDP per
capita—although for our data correlation was not particularly high (0.416). Regarding
the variable reflecting remoteness in GDP per capita, although its sign is negative (as
one could also expect), it is not significant for any of the specified models. In contrast,
the variable REMOTE_GDP has a negative impact, although it is not significant—recall
that it measures remoteness in per capita income, not in distance.
Assessing the impact of the specialization variables is intricate. The literature has
acknowledged how complex it may be using different approaches. For instance, Schott
(2004) indicates that “thinking about international specialization must shift away from
industries (e.g., apparel vs. machinery) and toward varieties within industries (e.g.,
analog vs. high-definition television)”. The evidence he finds in his paper would sug-
gest that conventional tests of trade theory which use industry-level data present some
difficulties because much of the endowment-driven specialization takes place at a level
14 As indicated by Jones and Bullen (1994), autocorrelation is a key feature of any geographic analysis.
Since standard statistical techniques assume that data are independent, it is important to report robust
standard errors which are “adjusted” to take account of the autocorrelation (Jones and Bullen, 1994, p.269).
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that until relatively recently was not available. In our particular setting, the share of
total energy in each country’s exports (ENERGY) has a negative and significant effect
throughout on the discrepancies between DOθ=1 and DOθ=0. This result is reason-
able, implying that high energy-exporting countries are those whose openness is less
affected by distance (their volume of exports is not determined by the location of their
trading partners), whereas the opposite pattern holds for low energy-exporting coun-
tries. This effect does not hold for other specializations such as AGRICULTURE and
FOOD_PRODUCTS, whose sign is positive throughout—although not always signifi-
cant.
The variables related to free trade areas must be commented on jointly, given there
are non-negligible interactions among them. Countries with the highest DOθ=1/DOθ=0
ratios are those more affected by distance when evaluating their openness. However, as
indicated by the columns in Table 4 corresponding to models 2 and 4, being member
of a regional trade agreement (RTA variable) has a negative effect on DOθ=1/DOθ=0 or,
equivalently, countries adhered to the RTAs considered in this study are less affected
by distance in their degrees of openness. This sign is dominated by the negative and
significant coefficient (at the 1% level) found for EU (models 1 and 3), and constitutes
a plausible result, given that many EU countries are quite open—especially to their
RTA partners. Yet not all RTAs contribute the same way, since only EU shows signif-
icant relationships throughout. In the case of ASEAN and NAFTA the relationships
are significant, but significance is not reached throughout—especially for ASEAN. For
MERCOSUR it is never significant. Therefore, one may easily infer that it is relevant
to consider the different trade agreements separately due to their varying effects on
the dependent variable. Finally, we also analyze the “depth” of the free trade agree-
ments considered, as measured by YRTA, whose sign is negative and significant (1%)
throughout. That is, the longer the durability of the RTA, the less relevant the effect of
distance—as revealed by lower discrepancies between DOθ=1 and DOθ=0. Therefore, it
seems that once a particular country becomes member of an RTA, the effect of distance
shortly becomes as relevant as for older members.
We now turn to the analysis of the impact of each covariate on DBCθ=1/DBCθ=0. In
general, as revealed by Table 5, results vary remarkably with respect to those in Table
4, constituting further evidence on how different the economic meanings of the degree
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of openness and the degree of balanced connection are. Indeed, in many instances the
sign of the relationships is reversed, suggesting that DO and DBC are but different ways
through which economies become more trade integrated.
The impact of GDP on DBCθ=1/DBCθ=0 is negative and significant throughout.
Countries for which this discrepancy is high are those whose trading partners (both
in terms of number and proportionality) are close—i.e., once we control for distance,
the DBC increases sharply. This means that large countries, in terms of GDP, export
more proportionally both in terms of distance and size of their trading partners. This
finding might constitute a certain surprise for some large countries like the US, whose
exports to Canada are higher than those to distant and large countries such as Germany.
However, for some other large economies, not only Germany itself but also Japan, China
or India, exports are more geographically neutral—these countries export regardless of
the location of the importing countries, and in proportion to their relative sizes. The
impact of GDP_PC is similar, as one might a priori expect because of the high correlation
with GDP, although significance deteriorates slightly for Model 4. Regarding the impact
of REMOTE_GDP, it is also negative yet not-significant throughout (only at the 10%
significance level, for models 1 and 3), analogously to what we found for the degree of
openness.
The specialization variables are not entirely coincidental either when comparing Ta-
ble 4 and Table 5, and some results are intricate. However, in general the sign of the coef-
ficient is what one might a priori expect. For instance, the coefficient of AGRICULTURE
in Table 5 is positive and significant at the 1% level throughout, implying that for those
countries more specialized in agriculture (according to the RCA index of specialization)
distance is quite relevant—the DBC index rises sharply when comparing DBCθ=0 and
DBCθ=1. Therefore, given their specialization in agricultural products (generally perish-
able, and object of preferential trade agreements), these economies are used to exporting
to their neighbors, and consequently are not affected by geographically-neutral trade.
The variables related to free trade area membership also show dissimilar patterns
when comparing results in Table 4 and Table 5. The general effect (RTA) is not re-
versed, but it loses significance entirely. However, this outcome is the combination of
opposed effects. On the one hand, analogously to what was found for DO (Table 4), the
effect of ASEAN is negative and significant—but now the significance is much higher
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(1%). In contrast, all EU, MERCOSUR, and NAFTA are not only significant but, most
importantly, the sign of the coefficient is positive. Again, the effect of free trade area
membership varies across the different trade agreements. In the particular case of EU,
MERCOSUR, and NAFTA the positive effect indicates that the architecture of their
member’s trade relations is positively biased towards other members of the agreement.
However, the effect is the opposite in the case of ASEAN, and the bias exists towards
non-members of the free trade agreement.
At this point, it is important to reconcile the results found for DO (Table 4) and
DBC (Table 5), given the disparities found for some of the covariates. The origin of the
disparities is derived from the fact that, as stated throughout the paper, they measure
different aspects of international trade integration, which does not advance only via
trade openness but also via a balanced structure of trade relations. In this setting, the
effect of distance is neither homogeneous across countries nor across indicators.
The presence of spacial patterns in the residuals of any of the estimated models
could suggest that it would be beneficial to partially modify them to account for spatial
autocorrelation. While this is an interesting initiative, we think it goes beyond the aim
of our particular contribution, deserving a specific investigation.
6. Conclusions
Since the emergence of the study by Leamer and Levinsohn (1995), many research ini-
tiatives have debated the apparent inconsistency of declining trade-related costs (at least
for some products) and a highly negative and significant coefficient of distance in grav-
ity equations, which does not diminish over time. Some authors (Anderson and van
Wincoop, 2004) claim such inconsistency might not be real when realizing that technol-
ogy growth in shipping advanced more slowly than the rest of the economy during the
twentieth century and, consequently, transport costs might have increased as a fraction
of average marginal production costs. However, this interpretation has not been widely
accepted, and there is a non-negligible body of the literature that has explored differ-
ent explanations for this inconsistency (since with globalization one would expect the
distance coefficient to decline over time).
We provide yet another explanation for this “missing globalization puzzle”, as coined
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by Coe et al. (2002), also labeled as “the conservation of distance in international trade”
(Berthelon and Freund, 2008). Much of this evidence is framed within the context of
gravity equations, as indicated by the meta-analysis by Disdier and Head (2008). We
adopt a different stance, basing our explanation on the construction of two sets of in-
dicators on economic integration, one of them controlling for distance, the other being
distance-uncorrected. These indicators are based on the geographical neutrality concept
by Krugman (1996), and the Standard of Perfect International Integration by Frankel
(2000).
Our methods echo the ideas of Casetti (1972, 1991) and followers of the expansion
method. Since his early studies were published, several geographers have paid consid-
erable attention to contextual quantitative models, which moved away from models that
“denied” geography (Foster, 1991), allowing relationships to vary according to context.
Some geographers have dealt explicitly with the issue at stake. As indicated by Eldridge
and Jones (1991) “few concepts are more central to the discipline of geography than dis-
tance decay”, but “most research designs implicitly assume that the friction of distance
has—within any single model—an unvarying effect across the spatial units from which
data are derived and estimates made”. We attempt to measure explicitly how, in the
context of trade, this effect varies from country to country.
Results indicate that the discrepancies found among both sets of indicators (distance-
corrected and distance-uncorrected) have a non-negligible dynamic component, since
the importance of distance increased until the mid-nineties, but has returned to levels
of 30 years ago. This implies that, according to our indicators, the role of distance, on
average, is still there. However, a more interesting result is that discrepancies among
distance-corrected and distance-uncorrected indicators differ a great deal across coun-
tries. That is, the effect of distance is there, but the impact on each country’s level of
integration is varying and, therefore, it might be hazardous to attempt to identify con-
sistent empirical regularities that could ultimately lead to the formulation of “universal
spatial laws”. As indicated by Eldridge and Jones (1991), it may be more appropriate
to approach the conundrum we are dealing with (i.e., the conservation of distance in
international trade) via the expansion method, which “rejects the notion that models
should perform in a similar fashion across varied contexts” (Eldridge and Jones, 1991,
p.510).
27
A mere cursory look at the different levels of integration for the different countries
in our sample will promptly suggest that the heterogeneity found for the effect of dis-
tance might not be entirely random. Accordingly, we explore some factors that might
explain these discrepancies, finding that GDP, specialization and, very remarkably, re-
gional trade agreements contribute to explaining the heterogeneity. Yet for some of the
explanatory variables the relationship is rather involved, since RTA membership affects
distance depending on each particular RTA.
28
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Table 1: List of countries in the sample
Albania Germany Philippines
Algeria Greece Poland
Argentina Hong Kong Portugal
Australia Hungary Romania
Austria Iceland Singapore
Belgium and Luxembourg India South Africa
Brazil Indonesia South Korea
Brunei Darussalam Ireland Spain
Bulgaria Israel Sweden
Canada Italy Switzerland
Chile Japan Taiwan
China, People’s Rep. Malaysia Thailand
Colombia Mexico Tunisia
Czechoslovakia, former Morocco Turkey
Denmark Netherlands United Kingdom
Ecuador New Zealand United States
Egypt Nigeria USSR, former
Finland Norway Venezuela
France Pakistan Yugoslavia, former
Gabon Peru
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Table 2: DGO, DGBC and DGI, distance-uncorrected and distance-
corrected indices (%)
Year DGOθ=0 DGOθ=1 DGBCθ=0 DGBCθ=1 DGIθ=0 DGIθ=1
1967 8.03 12.13 57.66 82.42 20.30 30.41
1968 8.44 12.91 58.96 83.90 21.02 31.53
1969 8.90 13.67 58.26 84.22 21.32 32.45
1970 9.53 14.65 60.38 83.21 22.34 33.30
1971 9.53 14.70 59.46 84.60 22.22 33.47
1972 9.80 15.31 61.12 86.20 22.78 34.37
1973 11.04 17.34 63.97 86.67 24.76 36.83
1974 13.27 20.87 64.29 87.24 27.37 40.49
1975 12.25 18.94 62.56 88.11 26.00 38.97
1976 12.76 20.02 63.04 89.04 26.58 40.13
1977 12.81 20.59 62.74 89.52 26.62 40.66
1978 12.87 21.79 65.23 90.72 27.26 42.13
1979 14.18 22.81 65.55 90.69 28.73 43.38
1980 15.11 24.20 66.32 89.38 30.04 44.40
1981 14.63 24.75 66.93 89.05 29.63 44.59
1982 14.07 23.33 67.57 88.69 29.02 43.27
1983 13.84 23.58 66.90 89.65 28.55 43.51
1984 14.63 25.73 67.75 90.66 29.69 45.53
1985 14.25 24.92 67.33 89.78 29.10 44.48
1986 13.53 25.66 67.13 89.66 28.24 44.66
1987 13.99 26.69 68.02 90.07 28.92 45.82
1988 14.18 28.25 69.47 91.44 29.53 47.56
1989 14.62 28.33 70.38 91.28 30.13 47.85
1990 14.81 27.42 70.27 90.67 30.43 47.21
1991 14.52 27.84 69.63 90.82 30.14 47.58
1992 14.54 28.20 68.84 90.66 30.14 47.97
1993 14.38 29.61 67.11 90.16 29.55 48.81
1994 15.25 31.12 67.03 90.15 30.32 50.11
1995 16.38 32.42 67.16 89.76 31.37 51.13
1996 16.61 30.60 67.47 89.42 31.73 49.90
1997 17.51 31.63 66.90 89.08 32.47 50.67
1998 17.47 30.59 66.99 89.45 32.39 50.09
1999 17.41 31.24 67.20 89.29 32.40 50.61
2000 18.85 34.37 67.70 88.78 33.74 52.80
2001 18.28 31.44 67.66 89.54 33.12 51.08
2002 18.24 30.35 66.87 89.56 32.98 50.13
2003 18.78 30.38 65.89 89.48 33.19 49.91
2004 20.12 32.01 65.22 89.08 34.16 50.93
2005 20.84 32.27 67.10 88.80 35.48 50.96
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Table 3: Discrepancies between DBCθ=0 and DBCθ=1 (%), selected countries
Degree of balanced connection (DBC)
Distance relevant (year 2005) Distance irrelevant (year 2005)
Country θ = 0 θ = 1 Country θ = 0 θ = 1
Austria 42.66 88.52 Brazil 89.48 91.37
Belgium 48.25 92.77 Chile 88.02 81.43
Denmark 51.30 87.58 China 97.77 79.14
Finland 48.86 86.11 India 92.88 89.47
Italy 63.77 97.08 Nigeria 89.79 85.46
Spain 44.24 87.25 Peru 90.61 92.73
U.S. 57.59 90.51 South Africa 77.62 80.38
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Table 4: Determinants of the distance effect, degree of openness, 1967–2005
Dependent variable: DOθ=1/DOθ=0
Coefficients Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) −1.456∗∗∗ −1.454∗∗∗ −0.732∗∗∗ −0.652∗∗∗
(0.264) (0.265) (0.233) (0.230)
GDP 0.239∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018)
GDP_PC 0.292∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023)
REMOTE_GDP −4.394 −3.490 −9.103 −8.480
(9.764) (9.816) (10.036) (10.103)
CONSTRUCTION −0.038∗∗ −0.040∗∗ −0.035∗∗ −0.040∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
BASIC_METALS −0.034∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗ −0.021∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
TEXTILES −0.040∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
WOOD_PAPER −0.097∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
METAL_PRODUCTS 0.016 0.013 0.054∗ 0.060∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
CHEMICALS −0.143∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
MINING −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ENERGY −0.021∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
AGRICULTURE 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
FOOD_PRODUCTS 0.004 0.004 0.008∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
MISC 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
YRTA −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
EU −0.129∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018)
NAFTA −0.077∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.015)
ASEAN −0.112∗∗ −0.026
(0.044) (0.045)
MERCOSUR −0.016 0.015
(0.017) (0.018)
RTA −0.102∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014)
R¯2 0.197 0.194 0.185 0.180
σ 0.239 0.239 0.240 0.241
F 180.629 187.660 177.718 183.929
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-likelihood 72.298 68.898 56.228 49.052
N 2, 301 2, 301 2, 301 2, 301
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respec-
tively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 5: Determinants of the distance effect, degree of balanced connection, 1967–2005
Dependent variable: DBCθ=1/DBCθ=0
Coefficients Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) 4.639∗∗∗ 4.521∗∗∗ 3.096∗∗∗ 2.419∗∗∗
(0.460) (0.438) (0.400) (0.450)
GDP −0.214∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.031)
GDP_PC −0.166∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗
(0.036) (0.039)
REMOTE_GDP −43.836∗ −30.311 −39.619 −26.271
(26.027) (28.410) (26.365) (28.935)
CONSTRUCTION 0.077∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
BASIC_METALS 0.119∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
TEXTILES 0.069∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
WOOD_PAPER 0.072∗∗∗ 0.011 0.091∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗
(0.026) (0.019) (0.027) (0.018)
METAL_PRODUCTS 0.258∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗
(0.061) (0.054) (0.051) (0.040)
CHEMICALS −0.151∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.034) (0.037) (0.034)
MINING −0.028∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
ENERGY 0.071∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019)
AGRICULTURE 0.055∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
FOOD_PRODUCTS 0.016∗ 0.012 0.010 0.003
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
MISC −0.036∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
YRTA −0.001 0.002 −0.004∗∗ −0.003∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
EU 0.343∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.064)
NAFTA 0.135∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.020)
ASEAN −1.623∗∗∗ −1.669∗∗∗
(0.425) (0.436)
MERCOSUR 0.114∗∗ 0.098∗
(0.050) (0.051)
RTA −0.051 −0.062
(0.059) (0.061)
R2 0.271 0.171 0.256 0.152
σ 0.368 0.392 0.372 0.397
F 85.946 75.111 83.523 72.729
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-likelihood −924.798 −1072.690 −949.252 −1098.929
N 2, 301 2, 301 2, 301 2, 301
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respec-
tively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Figure 1: Degree of openness (DGO), degree of balanced connection (DGBC), and de-
gree of integration (DGI), 1967–2005
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Figure 2: The role of distance, time trend (1967–2005)
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